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• Organ donation after cardiac death increases organ 
availability, but raises several legal and ethical issues, 
including consent.
• Medical interventions for people who are unconscious 
usually require guardian consent and must meet patients’ 
best-interests standards.
• Antemortem procedures can improve the success of organ 
transplant after cardiac death, but do not serve the patient’s 
medical interests, and it is contentious whether consent for 
antemortem interventions is legal under current Australian 
guardianship legislation.
• We argue that consent decisions should take patients’ wishes 
as well as their medical interests into account.
• Antemortem interventions are ethically and legally justified if 
the interventions are not harmful and the person concerned 
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has been renewed interest in donation after cardiac death, both in
Australia and internationally.5 International data indicate that it
increases the number of donor kidneys.6 In Australia to date,
predominantly kidneys have been procured from donors after
cardiac death, but other organs including lungs and the liver will
increasingly be procured in the future. In most instances, donations
after cardiac death have occurred subsequent to requests from donor
patients’ families.
Donation after cardiac death raises a number of specific ethical
and legal issues, including potential or perceived conflicts of inter-
est, treatment withdrawal processes, uncertainty about time of
death, and consent. In this article, we focus exclusively on the legal
and ethical permissibility of performing interventions before death
to improve the likely success of organ transplants. Organs procured
after cardiac death are at increased risk of damage secondary to
warm ischaemia and to thrombotic insults, and have a higher
incidence of delayed graft function than organs procured after brain
death.7 Current best practice includes antemortem administration of
drugs to minimise the risk of organ damage in the period just before
and after the death of the potential donor.7 It is also advisable for
treatment withdrawal and terminal palliative care to take place in or
adjacent to the operating theatre so that surgery can proceed as soon
as practicable after death has been declared and a stand-down time
observed. Some protocols for donation after cardiac death include
antemortem cannulation of the femoral vessels to facilitate rapid
infusion of organ-preserving solutions after death. A question that is
currently unresolved in Australia is whether or not antemortem
interventions, such as administration of drugs or femoral cut-down,
are ethically and legally permissible. Anecdotal evidence indicates
that, at present, antemortem interventions are not performed in
Australia due to concerns about the legality of consent (Dr Deborah
Verran, Chair, Organ Donation Network of New South Wales/
Australian Capital Territory, Donation after Cardiac Death Working
Party, personal communication, 3 February 2007).
Ethical issues
Consent is a critical mechanism for demonstrating respect for people
and their wishes. The current Australian opt-in system for organ
donation allows people to register their written consent to donation
with the Australian Organ Donor Register (AODR).8 In the absence
of formal registration, family members can communicate a person’s
desire to donate and provide the necessary legal permissions. The
current AODR form for potential donors does not distinguish
between donation after cardiac death and donation after brain death,
making it possible to argue that the consent given by registrants may
only be assumed for organ donations in situations familiar to the
public, namely donation after brain death. For consent to be
ethically valid, it must be informed and given without coercion.
Without explicit information on antemortem interventions, it is not
clear that a person signing the register is consenting to non-
therapeutic interventions or removal to an operating theatre before
death.
These objections lose force, however, when we consider consent
in more routine circumstances. Consent for an appendicectomy, for
example, does not usually include consideration of the individual
component procedures, such as the surgeon’s incision, removal of
appendix, type and technique of sutures, antibiotics, etc. Implicit in
the consent to the broad procedure is a consent to all reasonable
steps to facilitate successful removal of the appendix. Similarly, a
consent to organ donation could be viewed as a consent to take all
reasonable steps to ensure that the operation is successful, resulting
in transplantation of viable organs. On this view, consent registered
with the AODR, or a known wish to donate, would be ethically
sufficient to allow donation after cardiac death, including any
necessary antemortem interventions.
A second ethical consideration is that of avoiding harm. Do
antemortem interventions harm the patient? These interventions
include removal to an operating theatre, administration of heparin,
steroids, antibiotics or other drugs, or cannulation of femoral
vessels. Moving the patient to theatre before death may disturb the
patient or the family or both, and jeopardise the patient’s medicalber 3 • 6 August 2007
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is not clear that an operating room is a worse place to die than an
intensive care unit, which is where most patients with the potential
to be donors after cardiac death would otherwise be cared for. There
is no evidence that, in the absence of active bleeding, administration
of heparin would cause sufficient bleeding to contribute to death.7
As actively bleeding patients are not usually considered for donation
after cardiac death, heparin-related harms are unlikely. Heparin
could be administered through established intravenous lines, and its
administration would not interfere with the family’s attendance at
the bedside. Administration of steroids and antibiotics is unlikely to
be harmful. On the other hand, cannulation of the femoral vessels is
a physically invasive process that may disrupt the family, as they
would need to move away while this was performed and, if the
patient did not proceed to donation, the cannulas would then need
to be removed.
Legal issues
In relation to the legal question of antemortem interventions to
facilitate donation after cardiac death, it is well established that
treatment without consent is assault.9 As patients who are potential
donors after cardiac death are incapable of providing legally valid
consent at the time, an alternative legal decisionmaker must be
identified if there is no pre-existing consent. In non-urgent situa-
tions, there are a number of ways for this to be achieved. Patients
may create anticipatory or advance directives, or appoint various
kinds of legally valid guardians (eg, in South Australia, a medical
agent or an enduring guardian). There are two standards used in
proxy decision making: known wishes (also known as substituted
judgment) or best interests. With the known-wishes standard,
decisionmakers must make decisions in accordance with the known
wishes of the patient; that is, what the patient would have decided
for him- or herself. The best-interests standard requires proxy
decisionmakers to exercise authority in the best interests of the
patient. In reality, these considerations act in tandem, with decisions
about what the patient would have wanted being tempered by
consideration of the best interests of the patient.
In practical terms, many patients with the potential to be donors
after cardiac death are unlikely to have appointed a proxy decision-
maker, so that decisions about their care fall under the Guardianship
Acts. These Acts authorise an appropriately appointed guardian to
make medical decisions; in situations where donation after cardiac
death is possible, this is usually a relative. The Guardianship Acts vary
from state to state, but there is a governing principle found in most of
the Acts; for example, s5 of the Guardianship and Administration Act
1993 (SA) refers both to the best interests of the patient and his or her
wishes, if known. Similar provisions are present in each state:
Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT), s5A;
Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), s4, s32 and s46; Adult Guardianship Act
2006 (NT), s4 and s21; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000
(Qld), s61 and Schedule 1 s7(4) and s7(5), along with s12 which sets
out the health care principle; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995
(Tas), s6 and s43; Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic), s38;
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s4 and s51.
The question of patients’ wishes is relatively straightforward if
patients have registered their consent on the AODR, or their families
are aware of their wishes through discussions before the critical
incident. We have argued above that it may be ethically valid to
consider that consent to organ donation includes consent to all
measures necessary to ensure that organ donation is successful,
especially where these are not harmful to the patient. If we accept
this, there should be no barrier to guardian consent for antemortem
interventions, on the grounds that this is consent in line with the
person’s known wishes.
Can antemortem interventions be justified legally under the best-
interests standard? This is a more complicated question. Antemor-
tem interventions are not necessary to further the physical wellbeing
of the patient. Rather, these interventions to preserve organ quality
Summary of the provisions for the wishes of the patient in Australian Guardianship Acts 
State Legislation Section Summary of provisions
ACT Guardianship and 
Management of Property 
Act 1991
s4(2)(a) “. . . the protected person’s wishes, as far as they can be worked out, must be given effect to, 
unless making the decision in accordance with the wishes is likely to significantly adversely affect 
the protected person’s interests.”
NSW Guardianship Act 1987 s4 and s32 General guardianship principles emphasise that the welfare and interests of such persons should 
be given paramount consideration, and that the views of such persons should be taken into 
consideration. 
NT Adult Guardianship 
Act 2006 
s4 Considerations relating to best interests include a direction that the wishes of a represented 
person are, wherever possible, given effect to. 




(ii) health care that is, in all the circumstances, in the adult’s best interests
7(4) “. . . the principle of substituted judgment must be used so that . . . [any decision maker] . . . 
considers [what] would be the adult’s views and wishes.” 
SA Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1993 
s5 Emphasis is on the individual’s interests: “consideration (and this will be the paramount 
consideration) must be given to what would, in the opinion of the decision maker, be the wishes of 
the person in the matter”.
Tas Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1995
s6(c) “The wishes of a person with a disability or in respect of whom an application is made under this 
Act are, if possible, carried into effect.”
Vic Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1986
s38 In determining whether treatment is in the best interests of the patient, the wishes of the patient is 
one of the considerations.
WA Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 
s4 Notes that a primary concern will be the best interests; however, decision makers must also 
“ascertain the views and wishes of the person concerned . . .” ◆MJA • Volume 187 Number 3 • 6 August 2007 169
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the interests of the patient, it could be argued that the guardian
cannot give consent because the intervention is beyond his or her
authority. Indeed, this position is reflected in the recently released
Organ donation after cardiac death: NSW guidelines.10 We believe that
this view relies on a limited interpretation of best interests, and is not
within the spirit of Australian guardianship legislation. In the
legislation of each state, the basic principles are clearly set out. The
focus is on the best-interests principle, but each of the Guardianship
Acts also includes reference to the wishes of the patient (see Box).
This means that, even in the absence of registration on the AODR,
the family may be able to give consent to antemortem interventions
if there is clear evidence that the patient wished to be an organ
donor. This can be justified on the grounds that a procedure which
is not harmful to the patient, and which has the potential to further
the patient’s wishes, can be viewed as being in his or her best
interests.
The issue of best interests was addressed by the UK House of
Lords in their decision on Airedale NHS Trust v Bland,11 and the
interpretation of best interests was recently cited with approval by
the Administrative Decisions Tribunal of NSW.12 The House of
Lords decision concerned withdrawing life-sustaining treatment
from 17-year-old Anthony Bland who had post-coma unresponsive-
ness (known as persistent vegetative state) after being crushed in the
Hillsborough soccer riots in 1989. His interests were said to include
his views and personality as well as how his family perceived and
remembered him.11 In particular, the Law Lords11 acknowledged
that a range of considerations should be taken into account when
determining best interests: “The principle of the best interests of an
incompetent . . . encompasses wider considerations [than futility of
treatment]”. A person is more than a biological collection of organs;
they have thoughts and opinions, a personality and an interest
grounded in these intangible considerations. When that person is
dying, his or her physical interests diminish. The only interests left
to be furthered are intangible interests, such as a wish to donate
organs. In Australia, the High Court has emphasised that the “best
interests approach offers no hierarchy of values” to guide decision-
making processes in difficult areas, and neither does it provide a
general legal principle.13 If we agree that it is in a person’s interests to
have his or her wishes fulfilled, then taking all necessary measures to
do so seems a logical step, especially when this may be done under
the authority of the Guardianship Acts.
Conclusion
The supply of organs available for transplantation in Australia may
be increased by donations after cardiac death, with success
enhanced by antemortem interventions. We argue that it is ethically
justified to perform non-harmful antemortem interventions on
patients whose wishes to donate organs after death are known,
either through AODR registration or from their relatives. Facilitating
organ donation in these circumstances respects the wishes of the
dying, meets ethical requirements for consent, and does not harm
the patient. It is legally valid for relatives to give consent for
antemortem interventions under guardianship legislation when the
patient’s wishes are known, as respecting his or her wishes is an
important part of acting in the patient’s best interests. We acknow-
ledge that this is not a universally accepted interpretation of
guardianship legislation (for example, see the NSW guidelines10). To
facilitate practice in this area, we need a more certain legislative
framework. This could be achieved by specifically addressing con-
sent for antemortem interventions in the Human Tissue Acts, which
govern other aspects of organ donation. Using the Human Tissue
Acts would avoid state-by-state interpretations of the Guardianship
Acts, which are not primarily concerned with organ donation.
Legislative change, together with informed community debate about
donation after cardiac death, will ensure that that those who wish to
donate organs after death understand the implications of their
decisions, and families and practitioners are legally protected when
they act to fulfil the wishes of potential donors.
Acknowledgements
We thank members of the Health Ethics Research Theme of the Ethics Centre
of South Australia and Dr Deborah Verran for helpful discussions on the ideas
presented here.
Competing interests
Wendy Rogers was Deputy Chair of the Australian Health Ethics Committee’s
Organ Donation Working Party.
The views in this article are ours alone and do not represent the official views
of this working party or any other organisation. Neither of us has any financial
or other connection with any aspects of organ donation, or any direct
interest in organ donation for personal reasons.
Author details
Bernadette Richards, BA, DipEd, LLB(Hons), Lecturer1
Wendy A Rogers, BM BS, FRACGP, PhD, Associate Professor2
1 Law School, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA.
2 Medical Ethics and Health Law, Department of Medical Education, 
Flinders University, Adelaide, SA.
Correspondence: wendy.rogers@flinders.edu.au
References
1 Opdam H, Silvester W. Identifying the potential organ donor: an audit of
hospital deaths. Intensive Care Med 2004; 30: 1390-1397.
2 Matthew T, Faull R, Snelling P. The shortage of kidneys for transplantation
in Australia [editorial]. Med J Aust 2005; 182: 204-205. 
3 The Australia and New Zealand Organ Donation Registry. Annual report of
the Australia and New Zealand Organ Donation Registry, 2006. http://
www.anzdata.org.au/ANZOD/ANZODReport/anzodreport.htm (accessed
Feb 2007).
4 Bhonagiri D, Wills P. Potential for organ donation in Victoria: an audit of
hospital deaths [letter]. Med J Aust 2007; 186: 157. 
5 Australians donate. Proceedings of the Non-Heart-Beating Donation Sym-
posium; 2004 Nov 26; Melbourne.
6 Jacobs RW, Kievit JK, Nederstigt AP, et al. Non-heartbeating donors: are
they worth the effort? Curr Opin Nephrol Hypertens 1998; 7: 655-658.
7 Bernat JL, D’Alessandro AM, Port FK, et al. Report of a National Confer-
ence on Donation after cardiac death. Am J Transplant 2006; 6: 281-291.
8 Medicare Australia. Australian Organ Donor Register. http://www.medicar-
eaustralia.gov.au/yourhealth/our_services/aaodr.shtml (accessed Feb
2007).
9 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479.
10 New South Wales Health. Organ donation after cardiac death: NSW
guidelines. Sydney: NSW Health, 2007: 6. http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/
policies/gl/2007/GL2007_012.html (accessed Jun 2007).
11 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
12 WK v Public Guardian (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 121.
13 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB
(1992) 175 CLR 218 (Marion’s case), per Brennan J, 270.
(Received 8 Feb 2007, accepted 17 May 2007) ❏170 MJA • Volume 187 Number 3 • 6 August 2007
